o transform himself at a suitable
opportunity into an ally of Russia, would have been an impartial
chairman in a conference held under the pressure of a Russian
mobilization. The more one thinks about this mediation proposal the more
convinced one becomes, that it would at least have worked for a
diplomatic victory for the Entente Powers.

"Grey put the whole machinery of the Triple Entente in motion in order
to force back Germany and Austria-Hungary along the whole line."[200]

[Footnote 200: Ibid., p. 545 _et seq_.]

An analysis of Professor Oncken's theses gives the following results:
First, Britain's efforts to preserve peace are admitted, but he fails to
mention any friendly advances to meet them. Secondly, the fundamental
principle underlying the Germanic attitude is again exposed, viz., that
Russia had no right to intervene in a question affecting the balance of
power in the Balkans and in Europe (_vide_, p. 63). Thirdly, a
diplomatic struggle was in progress along the whole line, between the
two groups of Powers.

In weighing the second point it would be wrong to assume that the
Central Empires were not fully aware of the presence of a far more vital
question behind the Austro-Serbian conflict. They knew it from the very
beginning and had already expressed threats in St. Petersburg, hoping to
achieve the same effect as in the Bosnian crisis. If Austria had been
allowed to destroy Serbia's military power the material forces of Europe
would have been seriously disturbed; the ineffectiveness of the Triple
Entente finally established, and its dissolution the inevitable
consequence.

If these considerations are correct then the statement attributed by M.
de L'Escaille (see p. 281) to Sir George Buchanan that Britain would
never draw the sword could only have served to strengthen the resolution
of the Germanic Powers in enforcing their point Germany above all
desired that the balance of power theory should be finally smashed, and
it may be safely assumed that an Austro-Serbian conflict seemed to her a
most fitting opportunity to realize her purpose.

The third point suggests two questions. Who provoked the diplomatic
conflict, and who would have benefited most by a diplomatic victory? A
reply to the first question is superfluous, and the answer to the second
is obvious from the preceding line of reasoning. Germany would have
reached the goal towards which she had striven for more than a
decade--the removal of a