ll diplomatic hindrances to the unlimited
assertion of her will in Europe. It may even be doubted whether the Dual
Alliance would have survived the shock.

Another phase of Professor Oncken's work is the open attack on Sir
Edward Grey. Only three years ago this statesman was acclaimed in
Germany as a man of peace--_the_ man who had prevented the Balkan War
from becoming a European conflagration. To-day he is accused by the same
nation of being the originator of the world war.

Oncken[201] goes back to the year 1905 and states that Sir Edward Grey
initiated only two members of the Cabinet--Mr. Asquith and Lord
Haldane--into the details of the agreement with France, and these three
gentlemen he refers to as the "inner circle." King Edward, and
afterwards Sir Edward Grey in continuing the late King's policy,
succeeded in harnessing the _revanche idee_ and the spirit of Russian
aggression to the chariot of British Imperialism. All offers of
friendship made by this country were insincere. (The professorial
pleader does not say so, but he leaves his readers to infer that
sincerity is a German monopoly.) Concerning the British Minister's
declaration in Parliament that no secret treaty existed with France,
Oncken remarks: "The declaration was just as true formally as it was a
lie in essentials."

[Footnote 201: The authorities (?) most frequently cited by Professor
Oncken in making out his case are Messrs. Morel, Macdonald, Hardie, G.
B. Shaw and the _Labour Leader_.--Author.]

Following the development of events after the conference proposal had
been dropped, Oncken writes: "Meanwhile the Russian Government
endeavoured to persuade England's leading statesman that the opinion
prevailed in Germany and Austria, that England would remain neutral in
every case, in consequence of this delusion the Central Powers were
obdurate. England could only dispel the danger of war by destroying this
false conception, _i.e._, openly joining Russia and France.

"It is noteworthy how quickly Grey assimilated this train of thought.
Disregarding the suggestions of the British Ambassador in St.
Petersburg, he did nothing to exercise a moderating influence upon
Russia and thereby further the success of the conversations between
Vienna and St. Petersburg. On the other hand, he proceeded to take steps
which probably in his opinion, were calculated to damp the supposed
desire for war on the part of Germany. Practically, the result of all
his actio