g a hegemony in
Europe. She was completely convinced that the domination of Europe
belonged to her by right of mental, moral and military superiority over
her neighbours. Not in vain have Germany's educational institutions
inculcated the belief in her population that the British Empire is an
effete monstrosity with feet of clay; France a rotten, decaying empire,
and Russia a barbarian Power with no new _Kultur_ to offer Europe except
the knout.
Inspired by such conceptions, together with an astoundingly exaggerated
idea of Germany's peerlessness in order, discipline, obedience,
morality, genius and other ethical values, as well as an unshaken belief
in Germany's invincibility by land and sea--the entire nation, from
Kaiser to cobbler, has long since held that by right of these
virtues--by right of her absolute superiority over all other
nations--Germany could and must claim other rights and powers than those
which fell to her under an antiquated balance of European power.
In few words that is the gospel of _Deutschland, Deutschland, ueber
alles_. These are the motives which inspired Germany's naval expansion
and forbade her to accept a compromise. The same ideals led to her
endeavours to shatter the _ententes_, and it is alone the general
acceptance of this gospel, which explains the remarkable unanimity with
which the German nation has stood behind the Kaiser's Government in each
trial of strength. They have learned to consider all attempts of the
lesser peoples (Britain, France and Russia included) to maintain
themselves against the Teutonic onset as impudent attacks on sacred
Germany, which also illuminates the fact that Germans call the present
struggle--"Germany's holy, sacred war."
German statesmen were quite clear as to the national course at least
fifteen years ago. Hence they have persistently pursued a policy of no
compromise and no agreements. A compromise recognizes and perpetuates,
in part at least, the very thing which stands in the way. An agreement
with Britain in regard to naval armaments would have perpetuated British
naval supremacy, as well as recognized its necessity. Likewise an
agreement, or the shadow of an understanding with France on the question
of Alsace-Lorraine would have been a recognition of French claims. Hence
on these two questions--which are merely given as examples illustrative
of German mentality--every attempt at an agreement has been a failure.
A cardinal point in Germany'
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