his own."[147]

[Footnote 147: Heinrich Binder: "Mit dem Hauptquartier nach Westen," pp.
107-9.]

Here we have a sorry picture of the poacher whom Germany feared so much.
The world knows now that neither Britain, France nor Russia were
prepared for war, which excludes the probability that they desired or
provoked a conflict. But Germany knew that, and much more, in the month
of July, 1914. Bethmann-Hollweg when addressing the Reichstag drew a
terrifying picture of French armies[148] standing ready to invade
Belgium, but he knew full well that the necessary base-fortresses were
lacking on the Franco-Belgian frontier.

[Footnote 148: Richard Grasshoff in his work "Belgien's Schuld"
("Belgium's Guilt"), p. 14 _et seq_., reproduces several confessions
alleged to have been made by French soldiers, prisoners of war in
Germany, stating that they entered Belgian territory on July 31st, 1914.
At present it is impossible to test the value of this evidence. Cf. p.
151.]

As regards the alleged plans which Germany's enemies had made to
annihilate Germany, it will be necessary for Professor Schoenborn to
prove that the Entente Powers had: (1.) Caused the murder in Serajewo;
(2.) Despatched the ultimatum to Serbia; (3.) Prepared themselves for
war. Until he proves these three points the world will continue to
believe that it was Germany alone who cherished "annihilation-plans."

Schoenborn mentions too, Britain's refusal to promise her neutrality
even if Germany respected the neutrality of Belgium. This offer was made
to Sir Edward Grey, who declined it. According to Professor Schoenborn
Germany's final decision to invade Belgium was only taken after that
refusal. It is a striking example of the immorality which prevails both
in Germany's business and political life. She gave her solemn pledge in
1839, yet endeavoured to sell the same pledge in 1914--for Britain's
neutrality!

The author once made an agreement with a German, but soon found that the
arrangement was ignored and wrote to the person in question: "You have
employed our arrangement merely as a means for making further incursions
into my rights."

That summarizes the Teutonic conception of a treaty, either private or
national. It is only a wedge with which to broaden the way for a further
advance. Usually a man signs an agreement with an idea of finality, and
looks forward to freedom from further worry in the matter. Not so the
German; with him it is an instrument