of the country; but in preparing it for greater
destinies, he had to meet the heavy expenditure by increased taxation,
and some of his measures made him the object of hostile demonstrations,
although he soon outlived his unpopularity. Cavour's first international
difficulty was with Austria; after the abortive rising at Milan in
February 1853, the Austrian government, in addition to other measures of
repression, confiscated the estates of those Lombards who had become
naturalized Piedmontese, although they had nothing to do with the
outbreak. Cavour took a strong line on this question, and on Austria's
refusal to withdraw the obnoxious decree, he recalled the Piedmontese
minister from Vienna, thus by his very audacity winning the sympathy of
the Western powers.

Then followed the Crimean War, in which Cavour first showed his
extraoidinary political insight and diplomatic genius. The first
suggestion of Piedmontese co-operation is usually believed to have come
from England, who desired the Italian contingent, not only as material
assistance, but also in order to reduce the overwhelming French
preponderance. From the Piedmontese point of view there were several
reasons why Cavour should desire his country to participate in the
campaign. Firstly, it was advisable to use every opportunity of making
the Italian question an international one; secondly, by joining the
alliance Piedmont would place the Western powers under an obligation;
thirdly, Cavour, like Balbo, believed that the Italian question was
bound up with the Eastern problem, and as Austria was demanding the
permission of the powers to occupy Alessandria, as a guarantee that
Piedmont would not profit by the war in the East to create trouble in
Italy, Piedmontese participation would in itself prove the best
guarantee; and finally, as he always looked to Italy and not merely to
Piedmont, he felt that, having proved to Europe that Italians could
combine order with liberty, it remained to show that they were capable
of fighting as well. But there were serious difficulties in the way. Had
Austria joined the allies, as at one time seemed probable, Sardinia's
position fighting by her side would have been an impossible one. On the
other hand, Piedmont could not demand definite promises of future aid
from the Western powers as some politicians desired, because these would
never have been given, lest Austria should be offended and driven into
the arms of Russia. Then, both t