e
angels and men. Those acting naturally embrace all the rest of the
creatures. A natural agent is one that cannot do anything else [than it
does], nor suspend its action _e.g._, fire. Men and angels were created
differently, after the image of God, that they might be free agents.
_Homines et angeli aliter conditi sunt ad imaginem Dei, ut sint liberum
agens._" (Planck 4, 669.) This freedom, which distinguishes man
essentially from all other creatures, according to Strigel, always
implies the power to will or not to will with respect to any object. He
says: The act of willing, be it good or evil, always belongs to the
will, because the will is so created that it can will or not, without
coercion. "_Ipsum velle, seu bonum seu malum, quod ad substantiam
attinet, semper est voluntatis; quia voluntas sic est condita, UT POSSIT
VELLE AUT NON; sed etiam hoc habet voluntas ex opere creationis quod
adhuc reliquum, et non prorsus abolitum et extinctum est, UT POSSIT
VELLE AUT NON SINE COACTIONE_." (674.) According to Strigel, the very
essence of the will consists in being able, in every instance, to decide
in either direction, for or against. Hence the very idea of will
involves also a certain ability to cooperate in conversion. (689.)

This freedom or ability to decide _pro_ or _con,_ says Strigel, is the
mode of action essential to man, his mode of action also in conversion.
And in the controversy on free will he sought to maintain that this
alleged mode of action was a part of the very essence of the human will
and being. At Weimar Strigel declared: "I do not wish to detract from
the will the mode of action which is different from other natural
actions. _Nolo voluntati detrahi modum agendi, qui est dissimilis aliis
actionibus naturalibus._" (Planck 4, 668.) Again: "The will is not a
natural, but a free agent; hence the will is converted not as a natural
agent, but as a free agent.... In conversion the will acts in its own
mode; it is not a statue or a log in conversion. Hence conversion does
not occur in a purely passive manner. _Voluntas non est agens naturale,
sed liberum; ergo convertitur voluntas non ut naturaliter agens, sed ut
liberum agens.... Et voluntas suo modo agit in conversione, nec est
statua vel truncus in conversione. Et per consequens non fit conversio
pure passive._" (Luthardt, 217. 219. 209.)

What Strigel means is that man, being a free agent, must, also in
conversion, be accorded the ability somehow to de