causes of conversion; for without man's will and intellect no
conversion is possible. Flacius replied: The will, indeed, is present in
conversion, for it is the will that is converted and experiences
conversion; but the inborn power of the natural will contributes nothing
to conversion, and therefore the will "is purely passive in the
reception of grace." (Preger 2, 217.) "We are pressed hard with the
sophistical objection that man is not converted without his knowledge
and will. But who doubts this? The entire question is: Whence does that
good knowledge originate? Whence does that good volition originate?"
(216.) "We certainly admit that in conversion there are many motions of
the intellect and will, good and bad. But the dispute among us is not
whether in conversion the intellect understands and the will wills; but
whence is the capability to think right, and whence is that good willing
of the will? Is it of us, as of ourselves, or is this sufficiency of
willing and thinking of God alone?" (Planck 4, 711.) The fact that God
alone converts man, said Flacius, "does not exclude the presence of the
will; but it does exclude all efficaciousness and operation of the
natural will in conversion (_non excludit voluntatem, ne adsit, sed
excludit omnem efficaciam et operationem naturalise voluntatis in
conversione_)." (Seeberg 4, 492.)

In order to prove man's cooperation in conversion, Strigel declared:
"Both [to will and to perform] are in some way acts of God and of
ourselves; for no willing and performing takes place unless we will.
_Utrumque [velle et perficere] aliquo modo Dei et nostrum est non fit
velle aut perficere nisi nobis volentibus._" Charging Strigel with
ambiguity, Flacius replied: "You speak of one kind of synergism and we
of another. You cannot affirm with a good conscience that these
questions are unknown to you." Strigel, protesting that he was unable to
see the difference, answered: "For God's sake, have a little forbearance
with me, I cannot see the difference. If that is to my discredit, let it
be to my discredit.--_Bitte um Gottes willen, man wolle mir's zugut
halten; ich kann's nicht ausmessen. Ist mir's eine Schand', so sei mir's
eine Schand'_." (Frank 1, 136.) Strigel, however, evidently meant that
man, too, has a share in _producing_ the good volition, while Flacius
understood the phraseology as Luther and Augustine explained it, the
latter, _e.g._, writing in _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio:_ "It is