FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   353   354   355   356   357   358   359   360   361   362   363   364   365   366   367   368   369   370   371   372   373   374   375   376   377  
378   379   380   381   382   383   384   385   386   387   388   389   390   391   392   393   394   395   396   397   398   399   400   401   402   >>   >|  
eology concerning original sin when Flacius, in his _De Primo et Secundo Capite ad Romanos, quatenus Libero Arbitrio Patrocinari Videntur,_ rejected the doctrine of an inborn idea of God and of His Law inscribed in the heart of natural man. On Rom. 1, 19 he comments: It is only from the effects in the world that man infers the existence of a supreme cause. And with respect to Rom. 2, 15 he maintains that Paul's statements were to be understood, not of a law written in the heart of man, but of a knowledge which the heathen had derived by inference, from experience, or from tradition of the fathers. On this point Strigel, no doubt was correct when he objected: If the knowledge of God's existence were really extinguished from the heart, there could be no discipline among men; and if man had no inborn knowledge of the Law, then there could be no such thing as conscience which condemns him when he sins. The fact that man fears punishments even when there is no government to fear, as was the case with Alexander when he had murdered Clitus, proves that in the heart there is a certain knowledge both of God and of His Law. (Preger 2, 213.) However, Flacius did not, as Strigel seems to insinuate, deny that natural man has an obscure knowledge of God's existence and Law, but merely maintained that this knowledge was not inborn or inherited, but acquired from without. 171. Controversy Precipitated by Flacius. Though Flacius, when he first made his statement concerning the substantiality of original sin may not have felt absolutely sure of the exact meaning, bearing, and correctness of his position, yet the facts do not warrant the assumption that afterwards he was in any way diffident or wavering in his attitude. Whatever his views on this subject may have been before 1560--after the fatal phrase had fallen from his lips, he never flinched nor flagged in zealously defending it. Nor was he ever disposed to compromise the matter as far as the substance of his doctrine was concerned. In 1570 Spangenberg of Mansfeld, who sided with Flacius, suggested that he retain his meaning, but change his language: "_Teneat Illyricus mentem, mutet linguam._" To this Flacius consented. On September 28 1570, he published his _Brief Confession,_ in which he agreed to abstain from the use of the term "substance." However, what he suggested as a substitute, _viz._, that original sin be defined as the nature of man (the word "nature," as he particula
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   353   354   355   356   357   358   359   360   361   362   363   364   365   366   367   368   369   370   371   372   373   374   375   376   377  
378   379   380   381   382   383   384   385   386   387   388   389   390   391   392   393   394   395   396   397   398   399   400   401   402   >>   >|  



Top keywords:
Flacius
 

knowledge

 
existence
 

original

 

inborn

 

nature

 
Strigel
 

suggested

 
meaning
 
However

substance

 

natural

 

doctrine

 

wavering

 

attitude

 
Whatever
 

diffident

 

phrase

 

particula

 

assumption


subject

 

warrant

 
substantiality
 

Confession

 
statement
 

Precipitated

 
Though
 

absolutely

 

position

 
correctness

bearing
 

published

 

abstain

 

fallen

 

linguam

 

mentem

 

Spangenberg

 

substitute

 

concerned

 

Controversy


Mansfeld

 

retain

 

change

 
defined
 
Teneat
 

Illyricus

 

consented

 

zealously

 

defending

 
flagged