eology concerning original sin
when Flacius, in his _De Primo et Secundo Capite ad Romanos, quatenus
Libero Arbitrio Patrocinari Videntur,_ rejected the doctrine of an
inborn idea of God and of His Law inscribed in the heart of natural
man. On Rom. 1, 19 he comments: It is only from the effects in the world
that man infers the existence of a supreme cause. And with respect to
Rom. 2, 15 he maintains that Paul's statements were to be understood,
not of a law written in the heart of man, but of a knowledge which the
heathen had derived by inference, from experience, or from tradition of
the fathers. On this point Strigel, no doubt was correct when he
objected: If the knowledge of God's existence were really extinguished
from the heart, there could be no discipline among men; and if man had
no inborn knowledge of the Law, then there could be no such thing as
conscience which condemns him when he sins. The fact that man fears
punishments even when there is no government to fear, as was the case
with Alexander when he had murdered Clitus, proves that in the heart
there is a certain knowledge both of God and of His Law. (Preger 2,
213.) However, Flacius did not, as Strigel seems to insinuate, deny that
natural man has an obscure knowledge of God's existence and Law, but
merely maintained that this knowledge was not inborn or inherited, but
acquired from without.
171. Controversy Precipitated by Flacius.
Though Flacius, when he first made his statement concerning the
substantiality of original sin may not have felt absolutely sure of the
exact meaning, bearing, and correctness of his position, yet the facts
do not warrant the assumption that afterwards he was in any way
diffident or wavering in his attitude. Whatever his views on this
subject may have been before 1560--after the fatal phrase had fallen
from his lips, he never flinched nor flagged in zealously defending it.
Nor was he ever disposed to compromise the matter as far as the
substance of his doctrine was concerned. In 1570 Spangenberg of
Mansfeld, who sided with Flacius, suggested that he retain his meaning,
but change his language: "_Teneat Illyricus mentem, mutet linguam._" To
this Flacius consented. On September 28 1570, he published his _Brief
Confession,_ in which he agreed to abstain from the use of the term
"substance." However, what he suggested as a substitute, _viz._, that
original sin be defined as the nature of man (the word "nature," as he
particula
|