espect to the issue formulated by Strigel: "I
explain my entire view as follows: Man is purely passive (_homo se habet
pure passive_). If you consider the native faculty of the will, its
willing and its powers, then he is purely passive when he receives (_in
accipiendo_). But if that divinely bestowed willing or spark of faith
kindled by the Spirit is considered, then this imparted willing and this
spark is not purely passive. But the Adamic will does not only not
operate or cooperate, but, according to the inborn malice of the heart,
even operates contrarily (_verum etiam pro nativa malitia cordis sui
contra operatur_)." (Planck 4, 697.) Thus Flacius clearly distinguished
between cooperation _before_ conversion (which he rejected absolutely)
and cooperation _after_ conversion (which he allowed). And pressing this
point, he said to Strigel: "I ask whether you say that the will
cooperates _before_ the gift of faith or _after_ faith has been received
whether you say that the will cooperates from natural powers, or in so
far as the good volition has been bestowed by the renovation of the Holy
Spirit. _Quaero, an dicas, voluntatem cooperari ante donum fidei aut
post acceptam fidem; an dicas, cooperari ex naturalibus viribus aut
quatenus ex renovatione Spiritus Sancti datum est bene velle._" (Seeberg
4, 492.) Again: I shall withdraw the charge of Pelagianism if you will
declare it as your opinion "that only the regenerated, sanctified,
renewed will cooperates, and not the other human, carnal, natural will."
"Confess openly and expressly and say clearly: 'I affirm that man
cooperates from faith and the good will bestowed by God, not from the
will he brings with him from his natural Adam--_quod homo cooperetur ex
fide et bono velle divinitus donato, non ex eo, quod attulit ex suo
naturali Adamo.'_" "We say, Only the regenerate will cooperates; if you
[Strigel] say the same, the controversy is at an end." Strigel, however,
who, to use a phrase of Luther (St. L. 18, 1673), was just as hard to
catch as Proteus of old, did not reply with a definite yes or no, but
repeated that it was only a weak assent (_qualiscumque assensio languida
trepida et imbecilla_) which man was able to render when his will was
incited and supported by the prevenient grace of the Holy Spirit.
(Preger 2, 217; Luthardt, 217. 222. 227; Frank 1, 115.)

164. Objections Answered.

At Weimar, Strigel insisted: The human will must not be eliminated as
one of the