talis incitatio includit proprias vires
ad perficiendum_). "I plead," said Flacius, "that by original sin man is
not only wounded, but, as the Scriptures affirm, entirely dead, and his
faculties to do that which is good have been destroyed; on the other
hand, however, he is alive and vigorous toward evil (_hominem ...
penitus esse mortuum, extinctum et interfectum ad bonum et contra
insuper vivum et vigentem ad malum_)." "The will is free with respect to
things beneath itself, but not with respect to things above itself. In
spiritual matters it is a servant of Satan." Hence, said Flacius, in
order to cooperate, new spiritual life must first be imparted to, and
created in, man by the grace of God. (Planck 4, 693ff.; Frank 1, 224ff.,
Luthardt, 224; Preger 2, 216.)

Strigel argued: If man is able only to sin and to resist the grace of
God, he cannot be held accountable for his actions. But Flacius replied:
"Also the non-regenerate are justly accused [made responsible for their
actions] for with the remnant of the carnal liberty they are able at
least to observe external decency (_Zucht_), which God earnestly demands
of us, for example, to hear God's Word, to go to church more frequently
than into the tavern." "Furthermore, there are many carnal
transgressions in which natural man could have done something which he
has not done." "God may justly hold us responsible also with respect to
things which we are unable to do because He has bestowed uninjured
powers upon the human race, which, though forewarned, man has shamefully
lost through his own fault." (Preger 2, 214f.)

Time and again Strigel told Flacius that according to his doctrine man
is coerced to sin and compelled to resist the grace of God. But the
latter replied: As far as his own powers are concerned, the natural will
of man indeed sins and resists inevitably and of necessity (_voluntas
repugnat necessario et inevitabiliter_), but not by coercion or
compulsion. Necessity to resist (_necessitas repugnandi_), Flacius
explained, does not involve coercion to resist (_coactio repugnandi_),
since there is such a thing as a necessity of immutability (_necessitas
immutabilitatis_), that is to say, man may be unable to act otherwise and
yet act willingly. The impossibility of being able to will otherwise
than one really wills, does, according to Flacius, not at all involve
coercion or compulsion. The holy angels are free from compulsion,
although they cannot sin or fall a