acts by a counsel and an energy which is infallible and immutable. So,
then, we find it written in all hearts alike that free will [defined as
a power independent of God's power] is nothing, although this writing
[in the hearts of men] be obscured through so many contrary disputations
and the great authority of so many persons who during so many ages have
been teaching differently." (E. 268; St. L. 1851.)
The very idea of God and omnipotence involves that free will is not, and
cannot be, a power independent of God. Luther: "However, even natural
reason is obliged to confess that the living and true God must be such a
one who by His freedom imposes necessity upon us, for, evidently, He
would be a ridiculous God or, more properly, an idol, who would either
foresee future events in an uncertain way, or be deceived by the events,
as the Gentiles have asserted an inescapable fate also for their gods.
God would be equally ridiculous if He could not do or did not do all
things, or if anything occurred without Him. Now, if foreknowledge and
omnipotence are conceded, it naturally follows as an irrefutable
consequence that we have not been made by ourselves, nor that we live or
do anything by ourselves, but through His omnipotence. Since, therefore,
He foreknew that we should be such [as we actually are], and even now
makes, moves, and governs us as such, pray, what can be imagined that is
free in us so as to occur differently than He has foreknown or now
works? God's foreknowledge and omnipotence, therefore, conflict directly
with our free will [when defined as a power independent of God]. For
either God will be mistaken in foreknowing, err also in acting (which is
impossible), or we shall act, and be acted upon, according to His
foreknowledge and action. By the omnipotence of God, however, I do not
mean that power by which He can do many things which He does not do but
that active omnipotence by means of which He powerfully works all things
in all, in which manner Scripture calls Him omnipotent. This omnipotence
and prescience of God, I say, entirely abolish the dogma of free will.
Nor can the obscurity of Scripture or the difficulty of the matter be
made a pretext here. The words are most clear, known even to children;
the subject-matter is plain and easy, judged to be so even by the
natural reason common to all, so that ever so long a series of ages,
times, and persons writing and teaching otherwise will avail nothing."
(E. 2
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