whatever. We read: "Now it follows that free will is a title altogether
divine and cannot belong to any other being, save only divine majesty,
for He, as the Psalmist sings [Ps. 115, 3], can do and does all that He
wills in heaven and in earth. Now, when this title is ascribed to men,
it is so ascribed with no more right than if also divinity itself were
ascribed to them,--a sacrilege than which there is none greater.
Accordingly it was the duty of theologians to abstain from this word
when they intended to speak of human power, and to reserve it
exclusively for God, thereupon also to remove it from the mouth and
discourse of men, claiming it as a sacred and venerable title for their
God. And if they would at all ascribe some power to man, they should
have taught that it be called by some other name than 'free will,'
especially since we all know and see that the common people are
miserably deceived and led astray by this term, for by it they hear and
conceive something very far different from what theologians mean and
discuss. 'Free will' is too magnificent, extensive, and comprehensive a
term; by it common people understand (as also the import and nature of
the word require) a power which can freely turn to either side, and
neither yields nor is subject to any one," (E. 158; St. L. 1720.)

If the term "free will" be retained, it should, according to Luther, be
conceived of as a power, not in divine things, but only in matters
subject to human reason. We read: "So, then, according to Erasmus, free
will is the power of the will which is able of itself to will and not to
will the Word and work of God, whereby it is led to things which exceed
both its comprehension and perception. For if it is able to will and not
to will, it is able also to love and to hate. If it is able to love and
to hate, it is able also, in some small degree, to keep the Law and to
believe the Gospel. For if you will or do not will, a certain thing, it
is impossible that by that will you should not be able to do something
of the work, even though, when hindered by another, you cannot complete
it." (E. 191; St. L. 1759.) "If, then, we are not willing to abandon
this term altogether, which would be the safest and most pious course to
follow, let us at least teach men to use it in good faith (_bona fide_)
only in the sense that free will be conceded to man, with respect to
such matters only as are not superior, but inferior to himself, _i.e._,
man is t