d has foreseen, this, according to Luther,
does not at all involve that man is coerced in his actions. Luther: "But
pray, are we disputing now concerning coercion and force? Have we not in
so many books testified that we speak of the necessity of immutability?
We know ... that Judas of his own volition betrayed Christ. But we
affirm that, if God foreknew it, this volition would certainly and
without fail occur in this very Judas.... We are not discussing the
point whether Judas became a traitor unwillingly or willingly, but
whether at the time foreappointed by God it infallibly had to happen
that Judas of his own volition betrayed Christ." (E. 270; St. L. 1853.)
Again: "What is it to me that free will is not coerced, but does what it
does willingly? It is enough for me to have you concede that it must
necessarily happen, that he [Judas] does what he does of his own
volition, and that he cannot conduct himself otherwise if God has so
foreknown it. If God foreknows that Judas will betray, or that he will
change his mind about it,--whichever of the two He shall have foreknown
will necessarily come to pass, else God would be mistaken in foreknowing
and foretelling,--which is impossible. Necessity of consequence effects
this: if God foreknows an event, it necessarily happens. In other words,
free will is nothing" [it is not a power independent of God or able to
nullify God's prescience]. (E. 272; St. L. 1855.)

To wish that God would abstain from impelling the wicked is, according
to Luther, tantamount to wishing that He cease to be God. Luther: "There
is still this question which some one may ask, 'Why does God not cease
to impel by His omnipotence, in consequence of which the will of the
wicked is moved to continue being wicked and even growing worse?' The
answer is: This is equivalent to desiring that God cease to be God for
the sake of the wicked, since one wishes His power and action to cease,
_i.e._, that He cease to be good, lest they become worse!" (E. 259; St.
L. 1839.)

239. Free Will a Mere Empty Title.

Luther considers free will (when defined as an ability in spiritual
matters or as a power independent of God) a mere word without anything
corresponding to it in reality (_figmentum in rebus seu titulus sine
re_, E.v.a. 5, 230), because natural will has powers only in matters
temporal and subject to reason, but none in spiritual things, and
because of itself and independently of God's omnipotence it has no power