l
good which is in each act of virtue, belongs, not to any special
vice, but to every vice, but sorrow in the Divine good about which
charity rejoices, belongs to a special vice, which is called sloth.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 3]
Whether Sloth Is a Mortal Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a mortal sin. For every
mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Divine Law. But sloth
seems contrary to no precept, as one may see by going through the
precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore sloth is not a mortal sin.
Obj. 2: Further, in the same genus, a sin of deed is no less grievous
than a sin of thought. Now it is not a mortal sin to refrain in deed
from some spiritual good which leads to God, else it would be a
mortal sin not to observe the counsels. Therefore it is not a mortal
sin to refrain in thought from such like spiritual works. Therefore
sloth is not a mortal sin.
Obj. 3: Further, no mortal sin is to be found in a perfect man. But
sloth is to be found in a perfect man: for Cassian says (De Instit.
Caenob. x, l) that "sloth is well known to the solitary, and is a
most vexatious and persistent foe to the hermit." Therefore sloth is
not always a mortal sin.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Cor. 7:20): "The sorrow of the
world worketh death." But such is sloth; for it is not sorrow
"according to God," which is contrasted with sorrow of the world.
Therefore it is a mortal sin.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 88, AA. 1, 2), mortal sin
is so called because it destroys the spiritual life which is the
effect of charity, whereby God dwells in us. Wherefore any sin which
by its very nature is contrary to charity is a mortal sin by reason
of its genus. And such is sloth, because the proper effect of charity
is joy in God, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 1), while sloth is sorrow
about spiritual good in as much as it is a Divine good. Therefore
sloth is a mortal sin in respect of its genus. But it must be
observed with regard to all sins that are mortal in respect of their
genus, that they are not mortal, save when they attain to their
perfection. Because the consummation of sin is in the consent of
reason: for we are speaking now of human sins consisting in human
acts, the principle of which is the reason. Wherefore if the sin be a
mere beginning of sin in the sensuality alone, without attaining to
the consent
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