ny sin of envy, saddens us, since, when he falls, we
believe that some are deservedly set up, and when he prospers, we
dread lest many suffer unjustly."
Secondly, we may grieve over another's good, not because he has it,
but because the good which he has, we have not: and this, properly
speaking, is zeal, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9). And if this
zeal be about virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy, according to 1 Cor.
14:1: "Be zealous for spiritual gifts": while, if it be about
temporal goods, it may be either sinful or sinless. Thirdly, one may
grieve over another's good, because he who happens to have that good
is unworthy of it. Such sorrow as this cannot be occasioned by
virtuous goods, which make a man righteous, but, as the Philosopher
states, is about riches, and those things which can accrue to the
worthy and the unworthy; and he calls this sorrow _nemesis_ [*The
nearest equivalent is "indignation." The use of the word "nemesis" to
signify "revenge" does not represent the original Greek.], saying
that it belongs to good morals. But he says this because he
considered temporal goods in themselves, in so far as they may seem
great to those who look not to eternal goods: whereas, according to
the teaching of faith, temporal goods that accrue to those who are
unworthy, are so disposed according to God's just ordinance, either
for the correction of those men, or for their condemnation, and such
goods are as nothing in comparison with the goods to come, which are
prepared for good men. Wherefore sorrow of this kind is forbidden in
Holy Writ, according to Ps. 36:1: "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor
envy them that work iniquity," and elsewhere (Ps. 72:2, 3): "My steps
had well nigh slipped, for I was envious of the wicked, when I saw
the prosperity of sinners [*Douay: 'because I had a zeal on occasion
of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners']." Fourthly, we
grieve over a man's good, in so far as his good surpasses ours; this
is envy properly speaking, and is always sinful, as also the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 10), because to do so is to grieve over
what should make us rejoice, viz. over our neighbor's good.
Reply Obj. 1: Envy there denotes the zeal with which we ought to
strive to progress with those who are better than we are.
Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers sorrow for another's good in
the first sense given above.
Reply Obj. 3: Envy differs from zeal, as stated above. Hence a
certain
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