a man shows the
unsteadiness of his mind, by the inordinate movements of members of
his body; while if it causes the body to move from one place to
another, it is called "instability"; or "instability" may denote
changeableness of purpose.
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QUESTION 36

OF ENVY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider envy, and under this head there are four points
of inquiry:

(1) What is envy?

(2) Whether it is a sin?

(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether it is a capital sin, and which are its daughters?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 1]

Whether Envy Is a Kind of Sorrow?

Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a kind of sorrow. For the
object of envy is a good, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) of the
envious man that "self-inflicted pain wounds the pining spirit, which
is racked by the prosperity of another." Therefore envy is not a kind
of sorrow.

Obj. 2: Further, likeness is a cause, not of sorrow but rather of
pleasure. But likeness is a cause of envy: for the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 10): "Men are envious of such as are like them in genus,
in knowledge, in stature, in habit, or in reputation." Therefore envy
is not a kind of sorrow.

Obj. 3: Further, sorrow is caused by a defect, wherefore those who
are in great defect are inclined to sorrow, as stated above (I-II, Q.
47, A. 3) when we were treating of the passions. Now those who lack
little, and who love honors, and who are considered wise, are
envious, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 10). Therefore envy
is not a kind of sorrow.

Obj. 4: Further, sorrow is opposed to pleasure. Now opposite effects
have not one and the same cause. Therefore, since the recollection of
goods once possessed is a cause of pleasure, as stated above (I-II,
Q. 32, A. 3) it will not be a cause of sorrow. But it is a cause of
envy; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that "we envy those who
have or have had things that befitted ourselves, or which we
possessed at some time." Therefore sloth is not a kind of sorrow.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) calls envy a
species of sorrow, and says that "envy is sorrow for another's good."

_I answer that,_ The object of a man's sorrow is his own evil. Now it
may happen that another's good is apprehended as one's own evil, and
in this way sorrow can be about another's good. But this happens in
two ways: first, when a man is sorry about another's