1: It would seem that sloth is not a special vice. For that
which is common to all vices does not constitute a special kind of
vice. But every vice makes a man sorrowful about the opposite
spiritual good: for the lustful man is sorrowful about the good of
continence, and the glutton about the good of abstinence. Since then
sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, as stated above (A. 1), it seems
that sloth is not a special sin.

Obj. 2: Further, sloth, through being a kind of sorrow, is opposed to
joy. Now joy is not accounted one special virtue. Therefore sloth
should not be reckoned a special vice.

Obj. 3: Further, since spiritual good is a general kind of object,
which virtue seeks, and vice shuns, it does not constitute a special
virtue or vice, unless it be determined by some addition. Now
nothing, seemingly, except toil, can determine it to sloth, if this
be a special vice; because the reason why a man shuns spiritual
goods, is that they are toilsome, wherefore sloth is a kind of
weariness: while dislike of toil, and love of bodily repose seem to
be due to the same cause, viz. idleness. Hence sloth would be nothing
but laziness, which seems untrue, for idleness is opposed to
carefulness, whereas sloth is opposed to joy. Therefore sloth is not
a special vice.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) distinguishes sloth from
the other vices. Therefore it is a special vice.

_I answer that,_ Since sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, if we take
spiritual good in a general way, sloth will not be a special vice,
because, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 1), every vice shuns the
spiritual good of its opposite virtue. Again it cannot be said that
sloth is a special vice, in so far as it shuns spiritual good, as
toilsome, or troublesome to the body, or as a hindrance to the body's
pleasure, for this again would not sever sloth from carnal vices,
whereby a man seeks bodily comfort and pleasure.

Wherefore we must say that a certain order exists among spiritual
goods, since all the spiritual goods that are in the acts of each
virtue are directed to one spiritual good, which is the Divine good,
about which there is a special virtue, viz. charity. Hence it is
proper to each virtue to rejoice in its own spiritual good, which
consists in its own act, while it belongs specially to charity to
have that spiritual joy whereby one rejoices in the Divine good. In
like manner the sorrow whereby one is displeased at the spiritua