obedience would seem to be the command of
a superior, of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there
are degrees of superiority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue,
comprising many special virtues.
_On the contrary,_ obedience is reckoned by some to be a part of
justice, as stated above (Q. 80).
_I answer that,_ A special virtue is assigned to all good deeds that
have a special reason of praise: for it belongs properly to virtue to
render a deed good. Now obedience to a superior is due in accordance
with the divinely established order of things, as shown above (A. 1),
and therefore it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and
order, as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iii) [*Cf. First Part, Q.
5, A. 5]. Again, this act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by
reason of its object. For while subjects have many obligations
towards their superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their
commands, stands out as special among the rest. Wherefore obedience
is a special virtue, and its specific object is a command tacit or
express, because the superior's will, however it become known, is a
tacit precept, and a man's obedience seems to be all the more prompt,
forasmuch as by obeying he forestalls the express command as soon as
he understands his superior's will.
Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents the one same material object from
admitting two special aspects to which two special virtues
correspond: thus a soldier, by defending his king's fortress, fulfils
both an act of fortitude, by facing the danger of death for a good
end, and an act of justice, by rendering due service to his lord.
Accordingly the aspect of precept, which obedience considers, occurs
in acts of all virtues, but not in all acts of virtue, since not all
acts of virtue are a matter of precept, as stated above (I-II, Q. 96,
A. 3). Moreover, certain things are sometimes a matter of precept,
and pertain to no other virtue, such things for instance as are not
evil except because they are forbidden. Wherefore, if obedience be
taken in its proper sense, as considering formally and intentionally
the aspect of precept, it will be a special virtue, and disobedience
a special sin: because in this way it is requisite for obedience that
one perform an act of justice or of some other virtue with the
intention of fulfilling a precept; and for disobedience that one
treat the precept with actual contempt. On the other hand, if
obedience be t
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