holds
its own in agreeable matters," because, to wit, one's own will seems
to tend principally, not to the accomplishment of the precept, but to
the fulfilment of one's own desire; but that "it increases in
disagreeable or difficult matters," because there one's own will
tends to nothing beside the precept. Yet this must be understood as
regards outward appearances: for, on the other hand, according to the
judgment of God, Who searches the heart, it may happen that even in
agreeable matters obedience, while holding its own, is nonetheless
praiseworthy, provided the will of him that obeys tend no less
devotedly [*Cf. Q. 82, A. 2] to the fulfilment of the precept.

Reply Obj. 4: Reverence regards directly the person that excels:
wherefore it admits a various species according to the various
aspects of excellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the
precept of the person that excels, and therefore admits of only one
aspect. And since obedience is due to a person's precept on account
of reverence to him, it follows that obedience to a man is of one
species, though the causes from which it proceeds differ specifically.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 3]

Whether Obedience Is the Greatest of the Virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that obedience is the greatest of the virtues.
For it is written (1 Kings 15:22): "Obedience is better than
sacrifices." Now the offering of sacrifices belongs to religion,
which is the greatest of all moral virtues, as shown above (Q. 81, A.
6). Therefore obedience is the greatest of all virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the
only virtue that ingrafts virtues in the soul and protects them when
ingrafted." Now the cause is greater than the effect. Therefore
obedience is greater than all the virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "evil should never
be done out of obedience: yet sometimes for the sake of obedience we
should lay aside the good we are doing." Now one does not lay aside a
thing except for something better. Therefore obedience, for whose
sake the good of other virtues is set aside, is better than other
virtues.

_On the contrary,_ obedience deserves praise because it proceeds from
charity: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience should be
practiced, not out of servile fear, but from a sense of charity, not
through fear of punishment, but through love of justice." Therefore
charity is a