it is not the whole but only a part of the
multitude that has sinned, then if the guilty can be separated from
the innocent, vengeance should be wrought on them: provided, however,
that this can be done without scandal to others; else the multitude
should be spared and severity foregone. The same applies to the
sovereign, whom the multitude follow. For his sin should be borne
with, if it cannot be punished without scandal to the multitude:
unless indeed his sin were such, that it would do more harm to the
multitude, either spiritually or temporally, than would the scandal
that was feared to arise from his punishment.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 108, Art. 2]
Whether Vengeance Is a Special Virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not a special and distinct
virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for their good deeds, so
are the wicked punished for their evil deeds. Now the rewarding of
the good does not belong to a special virtue, but is an act of
commutative justice. Therefore in the same way vengeance should not
be accounted a special virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, there is no need to appoint a special virtue for an
act to which a man is sufficiently disposed by the other virtues. Now
man is sufficiently disposed by the virtues of fortitude or zeal to
avenge evil. Therefore vengeance should not be reckoned a special
virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, there is a special vice opposed to every special
virtue. But seemingly no special vice is opposed to vengeance.
Therefore it is not a special virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of
justice.
_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1), aptitude
to virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us
through habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that
virtues perfect us so that we follow in due manner our natural
inclinations, which belong to the natural right. Wherefore to every
definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now
there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which
reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the
concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs,
lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already
been inflicted on him, with the intention, not of harming, but of
removing the harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says
(De Invent. Rhet. ii) that b
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