and thereto
man is perfected by the virtue of truth. Wherefore it is evident that
truth is a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: The true and the good are convertible as to subject,
since every true thing is good, and every good thing is true. But
considered logically, they exceed one another, even as the intellect
and will exceed one another. For the intellect understands the will
and many things besides, and the will desires things pertaining to
the intellect, and many others. Wherefore the _true_ considered in
its proper aspect as a perfection of the intellect is a particular
good, since it is something appetible: and in like manner the _good_
considered in its proper aspect as the end of the appetite is
something true, since it is something intelligible. Therefore since
virtue includes the aspect of goodness, it is possible for truth to
be a special virtue, just as the _true_ is a special good; yet it is
not possible for goodness to be a special virtue, since rather,
considered logically, it is the genus of virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: The habits of virtue and vice take their species from
what is directly intended, and not from that which is accidental and
beside the intention. Now that a man states that which concerns
himself, belongs to the virtue of truth, as something directly
intended: although it may belong to other virtues consequently and
beside his principal intention. For the brave man intends to act
bravely: and that he shows his fortitude by acting bravely is a
consequence beside his principal intention.

Reply Obj. 3: The truth of life is the truth whereby a thing is true,
not whereby a person says what is true. Life like anything else is
said to be true, from the fact that it attains its rule and measure,
namely, the divine law; since rectitude of life depends on conformity
to that law. This truth or rectitude is common to every virtue.

Reply Obj. 4: Simplicity is so called from its opposition to
duplicity, whereby, to wit, a man shows one thing outwardly while
having another in his heart: so that simplicity pertains to this
virtue. And it rectifies the intention, not indeed directly (since
this belongs to every virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a
man pretends one thing and intends another.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 109, Art. 3]

Whether Truth Is a Part of Justice?

Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a part of justice. For it
seems proper to justice to give anot