dy which is held up aloft by force,
lest it come down in accordance with the exigency of its form.
Therefore it is evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to
the virtue of truth.
Reply Obj. 1: We judge of a thing according to what is in it formally
and essentially rather than according to what is in it materially and
accidentally. Hence it is more in opposition to truth, considered as
a moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention of telling a
falsehood than to tell a falsehood with the intention of telling the
truth.
Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii), words hold
the chief place among other signs. And so when it is said that "a lie
is a false signification by words," the term "words" denotes every
kind of sign. Wherefore if a person intended to signify something
false by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying.
Reply Obj. 3: The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection of
lying, but not to its species, as neither does any effect belong to
the species of its cause.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 110, Art. 2]
Whether Lies Are Sufficiently Divided into Officious, Jocose, and
Mischievous Lies?
Objection 1: It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided into
"officious," "jocose" and "mischievous" lies. For a division should
be made according to that which pertains to a thing by reason of its
nature, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vii, text. 43; De Part.
Animal i, 3). But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting
from a moral act is something beside and accidental to the species of
that act, so that an indefinite number of effects can result from one
act. Now this division is made according to the intention of the
effect: for a "jocose" lie is told in order to make fun, an
"officious" lie for some useful purpose, and a "mischievous" lie in
order to injure someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in
this way.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. xiv) gives eight kinds of
lies. The first is "in religious doctrine"; the second is "a lie that
profits no one and injures someone"; the third "profits one party so
as to injure another"; the fourth is "told out of mere lust of lying
and deceiving"; the fifth is "told out of the desire to please"; the
sixth "injures no one, and profits someone in saving his money"; the
seventh "injures no one and profits someone in saving him from
death"; the eighth "injures no one, and pro
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