money, whence covetousness (_avaritia_) is denominated.

Since, however, the verb "to have," which seems to have been
originally employed in connection with possessions whereof we are
absolute masters, is applied to many other things (thus a man is said
to have health, a wife, clothes, and so forth, as stated in _De
Praedicamentis_), consequently the term "covetousness" has been
amplified to denote all immoderate desire for having anything
whatever. Thus Gregory says in a homily (xvi in Ev.) that
"covetousness is a desire not only for money, but also for knowledge
and high places, when prominence is immoderately sought after." In
this way covetousness is not a special sin: and in this sense
Augustine speaks of covetousness in the passage quoted in the First
Objection. Wherefore this suffices for the Reply to the First
Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: All those external things that are subject to the uses
of human life are comprised under the term "money," inasmuch as they
have the aspect of useful good. But there are certain external goods
that can be obtained by money, such as pleasures, honors, and so
forth, which are desirable under another aspect. Wherefore the desire
for such things is not properly called covetousness, in so far as it
is a special vice.

Reply Obj. 3: This gloss speaks of the inordinate concupiscence for
anything whatever. For it is easy to understand that if it is
forbidden to covet another's possessions it is also forbidden to
covet those things that can be obtained by means of those possessions.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 3]

Whether Covetousness Is Opposed to Liberality?

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not opposed to liberality.
For Chrysostom, commenting on Matt. 5:6, "Blessed are they that
hunger and thirst after justice," says, (Hom. xv in Matth.) that
there are two kinds of justice, one general, and the other special,
to which covetousness is opposed: and the Philosopher says the same
(Ethic. v, 2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality.

Obj. 2: Further, the sin of covetousness consists in a man's
exceeding the measure in the things he possesses. But this measure is
appointed by justice. Therefore covetousness is directly opposed to
justice and not to liberality.

Obj. 3: Further, liberality is a virtue that observes the mean
between two contrary vices, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 7;
iv, 1). But covetousness has no co