scence of theft and
adultery had to be forbidden by special precepts, but not the
concupiscence of murder.
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TREATISE ON FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE (QQ. 123-170)
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QUESTION 123

OF FORTITUDE
(In Twelve Articles)

After considering justice we must in due sequence consider fortitude.
We must (1) consider the virtue itself of fortitude; (2) its parts;
(3) the gift corresponding thereto; (4) the precepts that pertain to
it.

Concerning fortitude three things have to be considered:
(1) Fortitude itself; (2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom;
(3) the vices opposed to fortitude.

Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether fortitude is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) Whether fortitude is only about fear and daring?

(4) Whether it is only about fear of death?

(5) Whether it is only in warlike matters?

(6) Whether endurance is its chief act?

(7) Whether its action is directed to its own good?

(8) Whether it takes pleasure in its own action?

(9) Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?

(10) Whether it makes use of anger in its action?

(11) Whether it is a cardinal virtue?

(12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal virtues.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 1]

Whether Fortitude Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a virtue. For the Apostle
says (2 Cor. 12:9): "Virtue is perfected in infirmity." But fortitude
is contrary to infirmity. Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, if it is a virtue, it is either theological,
intellectual, or moral. Now fortitude is not contained among the
theological virtues, nor among the intellectual virtues, as may be
gathered from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 2; Q. 62, A.
3). Neither, apparently, is it contained among the moral virtues,
since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7, 8): "Some seem to
be brave through ignorance; or through experience, as soldiers," both
of which cases seem to pertain to act rather than to moral virtue,
"and some are called brave on account of certain passions"; for
instance, on account of fear of threats, or of dishonor, or again on
account of sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral virtue does not act from
passion but from choice, as stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4).
Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, human virtue resides chie