to do whatever he will, but because,
unlike irrational creatures, he is not compelled by natural necessity
to do what he ought to do, but is left the free choice proceeding
from his own counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his own
counsel in doing other things, so too has he in the point of obeying
his superiors. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxv), "When we humbly give
way to another's voice, we overcome ourselves in our own hearts."
Reply Obj. 2: The will of God is the first rule whereby all rational
wills are regulated: and to this rule one will approaches more than
another, according to a divinely appointed order. Hence the will of
the one man who issues a command may be as a second rule to the will
of this other man who obeys him.
Reply Obj. 3: A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two ways. In one
way on the part of the deed itself, because, to wit, one is not bound
to do it; in another way, on the part of the doer, because he does it
of his own free will. Now a deed is rendered virtuous, praiseworthy
and meritorious, chiefly according as it proceeds from the will.
Wherefore although obedience be a duty, if one obey with a prompt
will, one's merit is not for that reason diminished, especially
before God, Who sees not only the outward deed, but also the inward
will.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q, 104, Art. 2]
Whether Obedience Is a Special Virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that obedience is not a special virtue. For
disobedience is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is a general
sin, because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that "sin is to disobey
the divine law." Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, every special virtue is either theological or moral.
But obedience is not a theological virtue, since it is not comprised
under faith, hope or charity. Nor is it a moral virtue, since it does
not hold the mean between excess and deficiency, for the more
obedient one is the more is one praised. Therefore obedience is not a
special virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the
more meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it holds its own." But
every special virtue is the more to be praised the more it holds its
own, since virtue requires a man to exercise his will and choice, as
stated in _Ethic._ ii, 4. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
Obj. 4: Further, virtues differ in species according to their
objects. Now the object of
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