itself. In all other cases, so far as I
am aware, they hold it sufficient that the indictment charge, and
consequently that the jury find, simply that the act was done "contrary
to the form of the statute in such case made and provided;" in other
words, contrary to the orders of the government.

All these doctrines prevail universally among judges, and are, I think,
uniformly practised upon in courts of justice; and they plainly involve
the most absolute despotism on the part of the government.

But there is still another doctrine that extensively, and perhaps most
generally, prevails in practice, although judges are not agreed in
regard to its soundness. It is this: that it is not even necessary that
the jury should see or know, _for themselves_, what the law _is_ that is
charged to have been violated; nor to see or know, _for themselves_,
that the act charged was in violation of any law whatever;--but that it
is sufficient that they be simply _told by the judge_ that any act
whatever, charged in an indictment, is in violation of law, and that
they are then bound blindly to receive the declaration as true, and
convict a man accordingly, if they find that he has done the act
charged.

This doctrine is adopted by many among the most eminent judges, and the
reasons for it are thus given by Lord Mansfield:

"They (the jury) do not know, and are not presumed to know, the law.
They are not sworn to decide the law;[105] they are not required to
do it.... The jury ought not to assume the jurisdiction of law. They
do not know, and are not presumed to know, anything of the matter.
They do not understand the language in which it is conceived, or the
meaning of the terms. They have no rule to go by but their passions
and wishes."--_3 Term Rep._, 428, note.

What is this but saying that the people, who are supposed to be
represented in juries, and who institute and support the government, (of
course for the protection of their own rights and liberties, _as they
understand them_, for plainly no other motive can be attributed to
them,) are really the slaves of a despotic power, whose arbitrary
commands even they are not supposed competent to understand, but for the
transgression of which they are nevertheless to be punished as
criminals?

This is plainly the sum of the doctrine, because the jury are the peers
(equals) of the accused, and are therefore supposed to know the law as
well as he does, and as wel