nment of the United States at present
aware of any circumstances, concerning the use of war or merchant
submarines which would render the existing rules of international law
inapplicable to them." Moreover, "so far as the treatment of either
war or merchant submarines in American waters is concerned, the
Government of the United States reserves its liberty of action in all
respects and will treat such vessels as, in its opinion, becomes the
action of a power which may be said to have taken the first steps
toward establishing the principles of neutrality."

Finally, as to the danger to neutral submarines in waters frequented
by belligerent submarines, it was the duty of belligerents to
distinguish between them, and responsibility for any conflict arising
from neglect to do so must rest upon the negligent power.

This caustic exchange of views on harboring submarines took place
before the appearance of the _U-53_. Had the Allies deferred
approaching the United States until after that event, the situation
favored the belief that the submarine's behavior would have dictated a
different reply from Washington. Indeed, there was a strong
presumption that if another German armed submarine had the temerity to
visit an American port it might have been promptly interned, not under
international law, but at the behest of public opinion.

CHAPTER LII

GATHERING CLOUDS

The conduct of the country's foreign policy became hampered by the
presidential campaign. President Wilson was frankly uncertain of
reelection and embarrassed by the feeling that any determination he
made of a policy toward Germany might be overturned by his successful
opponent. So American domestic politics perceptibly intruded at this
stage in the country's foreign policy.

In fact, that policy was practically in suspension. Germany eagerly
availed herself of the hiatus, and, satisfying herself that President
Wilson would be defeated, and that his successor would adopt a
different attitude to her (she had no real ground for this
supposition), embarked upon a submarine activity that was in strange
contrast to the moderation which the German Chancellor had stubbornly
fought for in its conduct.

The point to be remembered was that Germany's pledge to President
Wilson was the only curb on frightfulness. Germany rashly assumed that
the defeat of President Wilson would nullify it. At any rate, his
uncertain outlook in the preelection period opened the way