ation under
international law. The only ground on which the American protest could
be justified was by contending that the blacklist violated
international comity. In other words, if it was not illegal--there was
no doubt of its legality--it was an incivility.

There had been the usual diplomatic exchange between the two
governments on the subject prefacing a lengthy communication sent by
Lord Grey--the new title of the British Foreign Secretary upon his
promotion to the peerage--on October 10, 1916. Therein he repeated
that the blacklist was promulgated in pursuance of the Trading with
the Enemy Act (a war measure explained in a previous volume), and was
a piece of purely municipal legislation. Moreover, the American
Government was assured, "the Government of Great Britain neither
purport nor claim to impose any disabilities or penalties upon neutral
individuals or upon neutral commerce. The measure is simply one which
enjoins those who owe allegiance to Great Britain to cease having
trade relations with persons who are found to be assisting or
rendering service to the enemy."

Nor were the steps taken confined to the United States:

"With the full consent of the Allied Governments, firms even in Allied
countries are being placed on the statutory list, if they are firms
with whom it is necessary to prevent British subjects from trading.
These considerations may, perhaps, serve to convince the Government of
the United States that the measures now being taken are not directed
against neutral trade in general. Still less are they directed against
American trade in particular; they are part of the general belligerent
operations designed to weaken the enemy's resources."

The burden of the note was that Great Britain maintained the right,
which in the existing crisis she also deemed a duty, to withhold
British facilities from those who conducted their trade for the
benefit of her foes. This right Lord Grey characterized as so obvious
that he could not believe the United States Government seriously
contested the inherent privilege of a sovereign state to exercise it
except under a misconception of the scope and intent of the measures
taken. It would appear that the American Government gracefully
surrendered, by default, its earlier contention that Great Britain had
no right to forbid her subjects from trading with American firms
having Teutonic affiliations.

The American objections to detentions and censorship of mail