tinue the fight for
existence, again forced upon it, _with the full employment of all the
weapons which are at its disposal_."
The Imperial Government furthermore hoped that the United States
would "view the new situation from the lofty heights of impartiality,
and assist on their part to prevent further misery and unavoidable
sacrifice of human life."
[Illustration: New German Submarine War Zone of February 1, 1917.]
The "new situation" as presented to the United States was that within
a barred zone Germany had drawn round the British and French coasts,
extending from the Shetlands as far south as Cape Finisterre, and to
the west some 700 miles into the Atlantic, and also in the
Mediterranean, all sea traffic would be stopped on and after February
1, 1917, and that neutral vessels navigating the proscribed waters
would do so at their own risk. The only exception made was a "safety
lane" permitted for one American vessel a week with identifiable
markings to sail to and from Falmouth through the Atlantic zone (the
United States Government to guarantee that it did not carry
contraband) and another safety lane admitting sea traffic through the
Mediterranean to Athens. All other vessels would be sunk without
regard to the pledges Germany made to the United States. Germany thus
practically shut off American traffic with Europe in pursuance of her
new sea warfare against her enemies.
The edict was extended to hospital ships on the charge that the Allies
used them for the transportation of munitions and troops. The charge
was denied by the British and French Governments; but frightfulness
admitted of no truth nor acceptance of denials of German charges,
obviously made deliberately to justify barbarities, and so hospital
ships, with their medical and nursing staffs and wounded, were to be
sunk whenever found by submarines.
The real attitude of Germany toward her withdrawn pledges to the
United States was betrayed by the German Chancellor in addressing the
Reichstag Committee on Ways and Means. He revealed that the pledges
were merely a temporary expedient, made to fill up a gap until more
submarines were available. It appeared that in March, May (when
Germany surrendered to the American demands), and in September, 1916,
the question of unrestricted warfare was not considered ripe for
decision--that is, Germany was not ready to defy the United States.
Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg thus defined the situation:
"I have alw
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