ance was scarcely three hundred yards; but the crescent
formation of the attack made the lines of advance converge, and before
half the distance was covered the Xth were compelled to halt, lest the
XIth Soudanese on the right flank should fire into them. The Dervishes
remained silent until the troops were within a hundred yards, when they
discharged two tremendous volleys, which were chiefly effective upon the
halted battalion. Major Sidney, Lieutenant Fitzclarence, and a dozen
men were shot dead. More than fifty men were wounded. All the Soudanese
thereupon with a loud shout rushed upon the entrenchment, stormed it,
and hunted the Dervishes into the houses. In the street-fighting which
followed, the numbers of the troops prevailed. The advance scarcely
paused until the river bank was reached, and by 7.30 Abu Hamed was in
the possession of the Egyptian forces.

The Dervish horsemen, who had remained spectators near the southern crag
during the attack, fled towards Berber as soon as they saw the attack
successful. Scarcely any of the infantry escaped.

In this action, besides the two British officers, Major H. M. Sidney and
Lieutenant E. Fitzclarence, 21 native soldiers were killed; 61 native
soldiers were wounded.

The news of the capture of Abu Hamed was carried swiftly by camel and
wire to all whom it might concern. The Sirdar, anticipating the result,
had already ordered the gunboats to commence the passage of the Fourth
Cataract. The camp at Railhead sprang to life after an unaccustomed
rest, and the line began again to grow rapidly. The Dervishes who were
hurrying from Berber were only twenty miles from Abu Hamed when they met
the fugitives. They immediately turned back, and retired to the foot of
the Fifth Cataract, whence after a few days' halt they continued their
retreat. Their proximity to the captured village shows how little time
the column had to spare, and that General Hunter was wise to press
his marches. The Emir who commanded at Berber heard of the loss of the
outpost on the 9th. He sent the messenger on to Metemma. Mahmud
replied on the 11th that he was starting at once with his whole army to
reinforce Berber. Apparently, however, he did not dare to move without
the Khalifa's permission; for his letters, as late as the 20th, show
that he had not broken his camp, and was still asking the Emir for
information as to the doings of the 'Turks.' Of a truth there was plenty
to tell.

On the 4th of August