ascertained, lived happily ever afterwards. There were no casualties
among the troops, but the Jaalin lost a few men in their pursuit. The
force then returned to the Atbara.
The 3rd of April was the last day the army spent at Ras-el-Hudi.
The period of waiting was over. The enemy's position had been duly
reconnoitred. His strength was believed to be sufficiently impaired
for a successful attack to be made. The camp at Hudi was becoming very
insanitary. Moreover, the situation, satisfactory though it was, was not
one which the commander could view without anxiety. All the time that
the army was operating on the Atbara it drew its supplies from the fort
at the confluence. Between this and the camp, convoys, protected only
by a handful of Camel Corps, passed once in every four days. Only the
idiotic apathy of the Dervishes allowed the communications to remain
uninterrupted. Mahmud was strong in cavalry. It will be evident to
anyone who looks at the map how easily a force might have moved along
the left bank to attack the convoys. Such tactics would have occurred
to most savage tribes. But in their last campaigns the Dervishes thought
only of battles, and disregarded all smaller enterprises. Had they
assailed the communications, the Sirdar might have been forced to build
a chain of forts and to guard his convoys with strong infantry escorts.
The fighting force would have been weakened, the troops have been
wearied, and the result must have been delayed. The Dervishes had as yet
attempted nothing. But there was no reason why they should not at any
moment become enterprising. It was time to make an end. On the 4th of
April the whole force moved to Abadar, and established themselves in a
new camp five miles nearer the enemy. The tiger was tired of watching:
he had taken his first stride towards his prey.
Although the information as to the enemy's strength and position
was accurate and complete, the Sirdar decided to order a final
reconnaissance on the 5th of April.
Starting at four o'clock Broadwood cut off the sharp angle which the
Atbara forms at Umdabia, and, avoiding the thick bush, soon approached
the Dervish camp. Not a sign of the enemy was seen during the march. The
bush by the Atbara appeared deserted. The camp gave no sign of life;
an ominous silence prevailed. The squadrons moved forward at a walk,
keeping about 1,200 yards away from the enemy's zeriba and almost
parallel to it. Presently, as they did so, a l
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