suddenly. As soon as the process of attrition was sufficiently
far advanced to demoralise the Dervish host, without completely
dissolving them, the Sirdar and his army moved. The victim, as if
petrified, was powerless to fly. The tiger crept forward two measured
strides--from Ras-el-Hudi to Abadar, from Abadar to Umdabia--crouched
for a moment, and then bounded with irresistible fury upon its prey and
tore it to pieces.

Such is a brief strategic account of the Atbara campaign; but the tale
must be told in full.

On the 23rd of January the Khalifa, having learned of the arrival of
British troops near Abu Hamed, and baffled by the disputes about the
command of his army, ordered Kerreri camp to be broken up, and permitted
his forces to return within the city, which he continued to fortify. A
few days later he authorised Mahmud to advance against Berber. What he
had not dared with 60,000 men he now attempted with 20,000. The course
of action which had for three months offered a good hope of success
he resolved to pursue only when it led to ruin. He forbade the advance
while it was advisable. When it was already become mad and fatal he
commanded it. And this was a man whose reputation for intelligence and
military skill had been bloodily demonstrated!

The gunboats ceaselessly patrolled the river, and exchanged shots with
the Dervish forts. Throughout January nothing of note had happened. The
reports of spies showed the Khalifa to be at Kerreri or in Omdurman.
Ahmed Fedil held the Shabluka Gorge, Osman Digna was at Shendi, and his
presence was proved by the construction of two new forts on that side
of the river. But beyond this the Dervishes had remained passive. On the
12th of February, however, it was noticed that their small outpost at
Khulli had been withdrawn. This event seemed to point to a renewal of
activity. It was felt that some important movement impended. But it was
not until the 15th that its nature was apparent, and the gunboats were
able to report definitely that Mahmud was crossing to the east bank of
the Nile. The flotilla exerted itself to harass the Dervishes and impede
the transportation; but although several sailing-boats and other river
craft were captured, Mahmud succeeded in moving his whole army to
Shendi by the 28th of February. His own headquarters were established at
Hosh-ben-Naga, a little village about five miles further south. A delay
of more than a fortnight followed, during which the gun