in spite of a sharp fight with a Dervish patrol, reached Berber on the
31st. As there was no armed force in the town, the enterprising allies
rode into the streets and occupied the grain store--the only public
building--in the name of the Government. They then sent word back to Abu
Hamed of what they had done, and sat down in the town, thus audaciously
captured, to await developments.

The astonishing news of the fall of Berber reached General Hunter on
the 2nd of September. He immediately telegraphed to Merawi. Sir Herbert
Kitchener was confronted with a momentous question: should Berber be
occupied or not? It may at first seem that there could be little doubt
about the matter. The objective of the expedition was Omdurman. The
occupation of Berber by an Egyptian garrison would settle at once the
difficulties near Suakin. The town was believed to be on the clear
waterway to the Dervish capital. The moral effect of its capture upon
the riverain tribes and throughout the Soudan would be enormous. Berber
was, in fact, the most important strategic point on the whole line
of advance. This great prize and advantage was now to be had for the
asking.

The opposite considerations were, however, tremendous. Abu Hamed marked
a definite stage in the advance. As long as Merawi and the other posts
in Dongola were strongly held, the line from Abu Hamed to Debba was
capable of easy defence. Abu Hamed could soon be made impregnable to
Dervish attack. The forces in Dongola could be quickly concentrated on
any threatened point. At this moment in the campaign it was possible
to stop and wait with perfect safety. In the meantime the Khalifa would
steadily weaken and the railway might steadily grow. When the line
reached the angle of the river, it would be time to continue the
systematic and cautious advance. Until then prudence and reason
counselled delay. To occupy Berber was to risk much. Mahmud, with a
large and victorious army, lay at Metemma. Osman Digna, with 2,000 men,
held Adarama almost within striking distance. The railway still lagged
in the desert. The Dongola garrisons must be weakened to provide a force
for Berber. The Dervishes had the advantage of occupying the interior of
the angle which the Nile forms at Abu Hamed. The troops in Berber
would have to draw their supplies by a long and slender line of camel
communication, winding along all the way from Merawi, and exposed, as a
glance at the map will show, throughout its wh