le way south of Abu Hamed. The blow still
impended, but it was delayed. As soon as he had come to this conclusion,
he no longer turned a deaf ear to Mahmud's solicitations. He knew that
the falling Nile would restrict the movements of the gunboats. He knew
that there were only 2,000 men in Berber--a mere handful. He did not
realise the tremendous power of rapid concentration which the railway
had given his enemies; and he began to think of offensive operations.
But Mahmud should not go alone. The whole strength of the Dervish army
should be exerted to drive back the invaders. All the troops in
Omdurman were ordered north. A great camp was again formed near Kerreri.
Thousands of camels were collected, and once more every preparation was
made for a general advance. At the beginning of December he sent his
own secretary to Mahmud to explain the plan, and to assure him of early
reinforcements and supplies. Lastly, Abdullah preached a new Jehad, and
it is remarkable that, while all former exhortations had been directed
against 'the infidel'--i.e., those who did not believe in the Mahdi--his
letters and sermons on this occasion summoned the tribes to destroy not
the Egyptians but the Christians. The Khalifa had no doubts as to who
inspired the movement which threatened him. There were at this time
scarcely 150 Europeans in the Soudan; but they had made their presence
felt.

The Sirdar was returning from Kassala when the rumours of an intended
Dervish advance began to grow. Every scrap of information was
assiduously collected by the Intelligence Department, but it was not
until the 18th of December, just as he reached Wady Halfa, that the
General received apparently certain news that the Khalifa, Mahmud, all
the Emirs, and the whole army were about to march north. There can be
no doubt that even this tardy movement of the enemy seriously threatened
the success of the operations. If the Dervishes moved swiftly, it looked
as if a very critical engagement would have to be fought to avoid a
damaging retreat. Sir H. Kitchener's reply to the Khalifa's open intent
was to order a general concentration of the available Egyptian army
towards Berber, to telegraph to Lord Cromer asking for a British
brigade, and to close the Suakin-Berber route.

The gunboat depot at the confluence, with only a half-battalion escort,
was now in an extremely exposed position. The gunboats could not steam
north, for the cataract four miles below the conflu