by the Desert Column in 1884 from Korti to Metemma; (2) the celebrated,
if not notorious, route from Suakin to Berber; (3) across the Nubian
desert from Korosko or Wady Halfa to Abu Hamed.
The question involved the whole strategy of the war. No more important
decision was ever taken by Sir Herbert Kitchener, whether in office or
in action. The request for a British division, the attack On Mahmud's
zeriba, the great left wheel towards Omdurman during that battle, the
treatment of the Marchand expedition, were matters of lesser resolve
than the selection of the line of advance. The known strength of the
Khalifa made it evident that a powerful force would be required for
the destruction of his army and the capture of his capital. The use of
railway transport to some point on the Nile whence there was a clear
waterway was therefore imperative. Berber and Metemma were known, and
Abu Hamed was believed, to fulfil this condition. But both Berber and
Metemma were important strategic points. It was improbable that the
Dervishes would abandon these keys to Khartoum and the Soudan without
severe resistance. It seemed likely, indeed, that the Khalifa would
strongly reinforce both towns, and desperately contest their possession.
The deserts between Korti and Metemma, and between Suakin and Berber,
contained scattered wells, and small raiding parties might have cut the
railway and perhaps have starved the army at its head. It was therefore
too dangerous to project the railway towards either Berber or Metemma
until they were actually in our hands. The argument is circular. The
towns could not be taken without a strong force; so strong a force could
not advance until the railway was made; and the railway could not be
made till the towns were taken.
Both the Korti-Metemma and the Suakin-Berber routes were therefore
rejected. The resolution to exclude the latter was further strengthened
by the fact that the labour of building a railway over the hills behind
Suakin would have been very great.
The route via Abu Hamed was selected by the exclusion of the
alternatives. But it had distinct and apparent advantages. Abu Hamed
was within striking distance of the army at Merawi. It was not a point
essential to the Dervish defences, and not, therefore, likely to be
so strongly garrisoned as Berber or Metemma. It might, therefore, be
captured by a column marching along the river, and sufficiently small
to be equipped with only camel transport.
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