iple of domicile, which has been only
summarily indicated, are treated under INTERNATIONAL LAW (Private). Here
we shall deal briefly with the determination of domicile itself.

The Roman jurists defined domicile to be the place "ubi quis larem
rerumque ac fortunarum summam constituit; unde rursus non sit
discessurus si nihil avocet: unde cum profectus est, peregrinari
videtur: quo si rediit peregrinari jam destitit." This makes that place
the domicile which may be described as the headquarters of the person
concerned; but a man's habits of life may point to no place, or may
point equally to two places, as his headquarters, and the connexion of
domicile with law requires that a man shall always have a domicile, and
never more than one. The former of these difficulties is met in the
manner described by Lord Westbury in _Udny_ v. _Udny_ (_Law Reports_, 1
House of Lords, Scottish Appeals). "It is," he said, "a settled
principle that no man shall be without a domicile, and to secure this
end the law attributes to every individual as soon as he is born the
domicile of his father, if the child be legitimate, and the domicile of
his mother, if the child be illegitimate. This is called the domicile of
origin, and is involuntary. It is the creation of the law, not of the
party. It may be extinguished by act of law, as for example by sentence
of death or exile for life, which destroys the _status civilis_ of the
criminal; but it cannot be destroyed by the will and act of the party.
Domicile of choice is the creation of the party. When a domicile of
choice is acquired, the domicile of origin is in abeyance, but is not
absolutely extinguished or obliterated. When a domicile of choice is
abandoned, the domicile of origin revives, a special intention to revert
to it not being necessary. A natural-born Englishman may domicile
himself in Holland, but if he breaks up his establishment there and
quits Holland, declaring that he will never return, it is absurd to
suppose that his Dutch domicile clings to him until he has set up his
tabernacle elsewhere." If to this we add that legitimate minors follow
the changes of the father's domicile and a married woman follows the
domicile of her husband, also that compulsory detention will not create
a domicile, the outlines of involuntary domicile will have been
sufficiently sketched.

For the establishment of a domicile of choice there must be both
_animus_ and _factum_, intention and fact. The fa