raversers were charged with having committed the offence of
CONSPIRACY; which, by the universally admitted common law of the land
for considerably upwards of five hundred years, exists "_where two, or
more than two, agree to do an illegal act_--that is, to effect something
in itself unlawful, or to effect by unlawful means something which in
itself may be indifferent, or even lawful."[1] Such an offence
constitutes a _misdemeanour_; and for that misdemeanour, and that
misdemeanour alone, the traversers were _indicted_. The government
might, as we explained in a former Number,[2] have proceeded by an
_ex-officio_ information at the suit of the crown, filed by the
Attorney-General; but in this instance, waiving all the privileges
appertaining to the kingly office, they appeared before the constituted
tribunal of the law as the redressers of the public wrongs, invested
however with no powers or authority beyond the simple rights enjoyed by
the meanest of its subjects--and preferred an _indictment_: which is "a
written accusation of one or more persons, of a crime or misdemeanour,
preferred to and presented on oath by a grand jury."[3] Now, in framing
an indictment, the following are the principles to be kept in view. They
were laid down with beautiful precision and terseness by Lord
Chief-Justice De Grey, in the case of Rex. _v._ Horne--2 Cowper's Rep.
682.

"The charge must contain such a description of the crime, that the
_defendant_ may know what crime it is which he is called upon to answer;
that the _jury_ may appear to be warranted in their conclusion of
'guilty,' or 'not guilty,' upon the premises delivered to them; and that
the _court_ may see such a definite crime, that they may apply the
punishment which the law prescribes."

There may be, and almost always are, several, sometimes many, counts in
a single indictment; and it is of peculiar importance in the present
case, to note the _reason_ why several counts are inserted, when the
indictment contains a charge of only one actual offence. First, when
there is any doubt as to which is the proper mode, in point of _law_, of
_describing_ the offence; secondly, lest, although the offence be
legally described on the face of the indictment, it should be one which
the _evidence_ would not meet or support. The sole object is, in short,
to avoid the risk of a frequent and final failure of justice on either
of the above two grounds. Technically speaking, each of these coun