in all
text-writers on the subject--not questioned, not doubted, not qualified,
but stated broadly and clearly. Now for the first time it has been
stated--and Mr Baron Parke himself admits that it _is_ for the first
time--that that rule applies only to motions in arrest of judgment. I
never before heard of such a limitation. I am quite sure that there is
no case to sanction it, no decision to warrant it, no authority to be
cited in support of it. I am quite satisfied, after all I have heard on
the subject, that there is no ground whatever for the doubt--no ground
whatever for the exception now insisted upon. * * * It is not NECESSARY
that the judgment should be awarded _with reference to any particular
count_. No such decision can be cited. No one not in the confidence of
the judges can tell in respect of what the judgment was awarded, _except
with reference to the record itself_. If there be defective counts, does
it by any means FOLLOW that the judges, in awarding judgment, appointed
any part of it with reference to the defective counts? There is no
similarity between the two cases: you cannot reason or argue from one to
the other. You must assume, UNLESS THE CONTRARY IS DISTINCTLY SHOWN,
that what the judges have done in that respect is right; that the
judgment, if there be any part of the record to support it, proceeded
upon that part. In writs of error, you are not allowed to _conjecture_,
to decide on _probabilities_, you must look to the record; and unless
the record itself, on the face of it, shows, not that there _may_ have
been, but that there HAS been manifest error in the apportioning of the
punishment, you cannot reverse the judgment. You upon conjecture reverse
the judgment; and if afterwards you were to consult the very judge by
whom it had been pronounced, you might find that he had at the time
taken that very point into consideration. You are therefore running the
hazard of reversing a judgment on the very grounds which were present to
the mind of the judge at the moment when that judgment was pronounced."
As to the statement, that judgment was awarded against each defendant
"FOR HIS OFFENCES aforesaid,"--thus argued the Chancellor:--

"But independently of this, my lords, let us look at the record itself,
and see whether, on the face of the record, there is any ground whatever
for this objection. Every record must be construed according to _its
legal effect_--according to its legal operation. You cannot