of it an offence in contemplation of law. If he were satisfied that
there was one single good count to be found in it, it would have been
idle, at this stage of the proceedings, to make the attempt; and it very
rarely happens that every one of the varied modes of stating the case
which has been adopted is erroneous and insufficient. If, then, the
motion was refused, nothing else remained but to pass the sentence,
which was duly recorded, and properly carried into effect. No formal or
further entry was made upon the record--matters remaining in _statu
quo_--unless the party convicted, satisfied that he had good ground for
doing so, and was able to afford it, determined to bring a writ of
error. _Then_ it became necessary, in order to obey the command
contained in the writ of error, to "make up the record"--_i. e._
formally and in technical detail to complete its narrative of the
proceedings, in due course of law; for which purpose the verdict would
be entered in legal form, generally (if such it had been in fact) or
specially, according to its legal effect, if a special verdict had been
delivered.

To return, now, to the course of proceedings in the present instance.

After desperate but unsuccessful efforts had been made, in the ensuing
term, to disturb the verdict, the last step which could be resorted to
in order to avert the sentence, was adopted--viz., a motion in arrest of
judgment, on the main ground that the indictment disclosed in _no part_
of it any indictable offence. It was expressly admitted by the
traversers' counsel, in making the motion, that if "the indictment did
disclose, with sufficient certainty, an indictable offence in all OR ANY
of its counts, the indictment was sufficient;" and it was then
"contended, that _not one_ of the counts disclosed, with sufficient
certainty, that the object of the agreement alleged in it was an
indictable offence." The court, however, was of a different opinion; and
the Chief-Justice, in delivering his judgment, thus expressed
himself--"It was boldly and perseveringly urged, that there was no crime
charged in the indictment. If there was one in any count, or in any part
of a count, that was sufficient." So said also Mr Justice Burton--"We
cannot arrest the judgment, if there be _any_ count on which to found
the judgment"--the other two judges expressly concurring in that
doctrine; and the whole court decided, moreover, that _all_ the counts
were sufficient in point of l