avoid
any attack from the enemy, though, by so doing, he must leave a fine
and fertile region open to their ravages; or a plentiful store-house,
from which they would draw voluntary supplies. A second move was
necessary, again to avoid the danger of being enclosed between two
rivers. Leaving three regiments, therefore, to guard the passes of the
Hackensack, and serve as covering parties, he again decamped, and
threw himself on the west bank of the Passaic, in the neighborhood of
Newark.
His army, small as it was, would soon be less. The term of enlistment
of those under General Mercer, from the flying camp, was nearly
expired; and it was not probable that, disheartened as they were by
defeats and losses, exposed to inclement weather, and unaccustomed to
military hardships they would longer forego the comforts of their
homes, to drag out the residue of a ruinous campaign. In addition,
too, to the superiority of the force that was following him, the
rivers gave the enemy facilities, by means of their shipping, to throw
troops in his rear. In this extremity he cast about in every direction
for assistance. Colonel Reed was despatched to Burlington with a
letter to Governor William Livingston, describing his hazardous
situation, and entreating him to call out a portion of the New Jersey
militia; and General Mifflin was sent to Philadelphia to implore
immediate aid from Congress and the local authorities.
His main reliance for prompt assistance, however, was upon Lee. On the
24th came a letter from that general, addressed to Colonel Reed.
Washington opened it, as he was accustomed to do, in the absence of
that officer, with letters addressed to him on the business of the
army. Lee was at his old encampment at Northcastle. He had no means,
he said, of crossing at Dobbs' Ferry, and the round by King's Ferry
would be so great that he could not get there in time to answer any
purpose. "I have therefore," added he, "ordered General Heath, who is
close to the only ferry which can be passed, to detach two thousand
men to apprise his Excellency, and await his further orders; a mode
which I flatter myself will answer better what I conceive to be the
spirit of the orders than should I move the corps from hence.
Withdrawing our troops from hence would be attended with some very
serious consequences, which at present would be tedious to enumerate;
as to myself," adds he, "I hope to set out to-morrow."
On the following day he writ
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