f late they had become careless and unguarded, knowing the broken
and dispirited state of the Americans, and considering them incapable
of any offensive enterprise. A brigade of three Hessian regiments,
those of Rahl, Lossberg, and Knyphausen, was stationed at Trenton.
Colonel Rahl had the command of the post at his own solicitation, and
in consequence of the laurels he had gained at White Plains and Fort
Washington. We have before us journals of two Hessian lieutenants and
a corporal, which give graphic particulars of the colonel and his
post. According to their representations, he, with all his bravery,
was little fitted for such an important command. He lacked the
necessary vigilance and forecast. One of the lieutenants speaks of him
in a sarcastic vein, and evidently with some degree of prejudice.
According to his account, there was more bustle than business at the
post. He was a boon companion; made merry until a late hour in the
night, and then lay in bed until nine o'clock in the morning. And then
he took no precautions against the possibility of being attacked. A
veteran officer, Major Von Dechow, proposed that some works should be
thrown up, where the cannon might be placed ready against any assault.
The colonel made merry with the very idea. "An assault by the rebels!
Let them come! We'll at them with the bayonet."

Such was the posture of affairs at Trenton at the time the _coup de
main_ was meditated. Whatever was to be done, however, must be done
quickly, before the river was frozen. An intercepted letter had
convinced Washington of what he had before suspected, that Howe was
only waiting for that event to resume active operations, cross the
river on the ice, and push on triumphantly to Philadelphia. He
communicated his project to Gates, and wished him to go to Bristol,
take command there, and co-operate from that quarter. Gates, however,
pleaded ill health, and requested leave to proceed to Philadelphia.

The request may have surprised Washington, considering the spirited
enterprise that was on foot; but Gates, as has before been observed,
had a disinclination to serve immediately under the commander-in-chief;
like Lee, he had a disparaging opinion of him, or rather an impatience
of his supremacy. He had, moreover, an ulterior object in view. Having
been disappointed and chagrined in finding himself subordinate to
General Schuyler in the Northern campaign, he was now intent on making
interest among the me