While anxiously exerting himself to strengthen his own precarious
army, the security of the northern department was urged upon his
attention. Schuyler represented it as in need of reinforcements and
supplies of all kinds. He apprehended that Carleton might make an
attack upon Ticonderoga as soon as he could cross Lake Champlain on
the ice. That important fortress was under the command of a brave
officer, Colonel Anthony Wayne, but its garrison had dwindled down to
six or seven hundred men, chiefly New England militia. In the present
destitute situation of his department as to troops, Schuyler feared
that Carleton might not only succeed in an attempt on Ticonderoga, but
might push his way to Albany. Although Washington considered a winter
attack of the kind specified by Schuyler too difficult and dangerous
to be very probable, he urged reinforcements from Massachusetts and
New Hampshire, whence they could be furnished most speedily.
Massachusetts, in fact, had already determined to send four regiments
to Schuyler's aid as soon as possible.

Notwithstanding all Washington's exertions in behalf of the army under
his immediate command, it continued to be deplorably in want of
reinforcements, and it was necessary to maintain the utmost vigilance
at all his posts to prevent his camp from being surprised. The
operations of the enemy might be delayed by the bad condition of the
roads, and the want of horses to move their artillery, but he
anticipated an attack as soon as the roads were passable, and
apprehended a disastrous result unless speedily reinforced.

The designs of the enemy being mere matter of conjecture, measures
varied accordingly. As the season advanced, Washington was led to
believe that Philadelphia would be their first object at the opening
of the campaign, and that they would bring round all their troops from
Canada by water to aid in the enterprise. Under this persuasion he
wrote to General Heath, ordering him to send eight Massachusetts
battalions to Peekskill. At Peekskill, he observed, "they would be
well placed to give support to any of the Eastern or Middle States; or
to oppose the enemy, should they design to penetrate the country up
the Hudson; or to cover New England, should they invade it."

On the 18th of March he despatched General Greene to Philadelphia, to
lay before Congress such matters as he could not venture to
communicate by letter. Greene had scarce departed when the enemy began
to give