le in the
exercise of the remainder it was to a certain extent protected against
the worst consequences of mistakes or perversities. It surrendered the
power of making peace or declaring war. Its relation to the other states
in the Union was strictly defined, so that it had no foreign policy and
responsibilities corresponding to its purely domestic ones. Its citizens
were aware that the protection of such fundamental institutions as that
of private property was lodged in the Federal government, and that in
the end that government had the power to guarantee them even against the
worst consequences of domestic disorder. Thus the state governments were
placed in the easy situation of rich annuitants, who had surrendered the
control of some political capital in order to enjoy with less care the
opportunities of a plethoric income.

The foregoing comment is not intended as any disparagement of a Federal
as contrasted with a centralized political system. Its purpose is to
justify the statement that, in a Federal system, local political
institutions should be adapted to their necessarily restricted
functions. The state governments were organized as smaller copies of the
central government, and the only alterations in the type permitted by
the Democrats looked in the direction of a further distribution of
responsibility. But a system which was adapted to the comprehensive task
of securing the welfare of a whole people might well fail as an engine
of merely local government,--even though the local government retained
certain major political functions. As a matter of fact, such has been
the case. The system of a triple division of specific powers, each one
of which was vigorous in its own sphere while at the same time checked
and balanced by the other branches of the government, has certain
advantages and certain disadvantages. Its great advantage is its
comparative safety, because under it no one function of government can
attain to any dangerous excess of power. Its great disadvantage consists
in the division of responsibility among three independent departments,
and the possibility that the public interest would suffer either from
lack of cooeperation or from actual conflicts. In the case of the general
government, the comparative safety of the system of checks and balances
was of paramount importance, because the despotic exercise of its vast
powers would have wrecked the whole American political system. On the
other hand, th