ecting state organization or
policy. An American electorate is or should be entirely competent to
decide whether in general it wishes gambling or the sale of intoxicating
liquors to be suppressed, whether it is willing or unwilling to delegate
large judicial and legislative authority to commissions, or whether it
wishes to exempt buildings from local taxation. In retaining the power
of deciding for itself these broad questions of public legislative
policy, it is exercising a function, adapted to the popular intelligence
and both disciplinary and formative in its effect on those who take the
responsibility seriously. Under any system of popular government--even
under a parliamentary system--such general questions are eventually
submitted to popular decision; and the more decisively they can be
submitted, the better. On the other hand, there is a large part of the
work of government, which must be delegated by the people to select
individuals, because it can be efficiently exercised only by peculiarly
experienced or competent men. The people are capable of passing upon the
general principle embodied in a proposed law; but they cannot be
expected to decide with any certainty of judgment about amendments or
details, which involve for their intelligent consideration technical and
special knowledge. Efficient law-making is as much a matter of
well-prepared and well-tempered detail as it is of an excellent general
principle, and this branch of legislation must necessarily be left to
experts selected in one way or another to represent the popular
interest. How can they best be selected and what should be their
functions?

An answer to these questions involves a consideration of the changes
which the referendum should bring with it in the whole system of local
government--an aspect of the matter which according to the usual
American habit has hitherto been neglected. In states like Oregon the
power of initiating and consummating legislation is bestowed on the
electorate without being taken away from the legislature; and a certain
share of necessary political business is left to a body which has been
expressly declared unworthy to exercise a more important share of the
same task. A legislative body, whose responsibilities and power are
still further reduced, will probably exercise their remaining functions
with even greater incompetence, and will, if possible, be composed of a
still more inferior class of legislative agents. If t