c supporters. Abuses have been abolished wherever the
reform has been introduced, but the abolition of abuses has not made for
any marked increase of efficiency. The civil service is still very far
from being in a satisfactory condition either in the central, state, or
municipal offices. Moreover, the passage of reform laws has not had any
appreciable effect upon the vitality or the power of the professional
politician. The machine has, on the whole, increased rather than
diminished in power, during the past twenty-five years. Civil service
reform is no longer as vigorously opposed as it used to be, because it
is no longer feared. The politicians have found that in its ordinary
shape it really does not do them any essential harm. The consequence is
that the agitation has drifted to the rear of the American political
battle, and fails to excite either the enthusiasm, the enmity, or the
interest that it did fifteen years ago.
Its partial failure has been due to the fact that the reformers merely
attacked one of the symptoms of a disease which was more deeply rooted
and more virulent than they supposed. They were outraged by the
appointment of administrative officials solely as a reward for partisan
service and without reference to their qualifications for their official
duties; and two means were devised to strike at this abuse. Lower
administrative officials were protected in their positions by depriving
their superiors of the power of removing them except for cause; and it
was provided that new appointments should be made from lists of
candidates whose eligibility was guaranteed by their ability to pass
examinations in subjects connected with the work of the office. These
were undoubtedly steps in a better direction; but they have failed to be
effective, because the attempt to secure a more meritorious selection of
public servants was not applied to higher grades of the service. At the
head of every public office was a man who had been appointed or elected
chiefly for partisan reasons; who served only for a short time; who
could become familiar with the work of his office, if at all, only
slowly; and who, because of his desire to be surrounded by his own
henchmen, was the possible enemy of the permanent staff. The civil
service laws have been designed, consequently, to a very considerable
extent for the purpose of protecting the subordinates against their
chiefs; and that is scarcely to be conceived as a method of organ
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