the ultimate purpose. Even if public opinion
eventually decided that the appropriation of the railroads was necessary
in the national economic interest, the end could in all probability be
very slowly realized. In return, for instance, for the benefit of
government credit, granted under properly regulated conditions, the
railroads might submit to the operation of some gradual system of
appropriation, which would operate only in the course of several
generations, and the money for which would be obtained by the taxation
of railroad earnings. It might, however, be possible to arrange a scheme
of immediate purchase and the conversion of all railway securities,
except those representing equipment and working capital, into one
special class of government security. In that case the whole railroad
system of the country could be organized into a certain limited number
of special systems, which could be leased for a definite term of years
to private corporations. These independent systems would in their mutual
relations stimulate that economic rivalry among localities which is the
wholesome aspect of railroad competition. Each of these companies
should, of course, be free to fix such rates as were considered
necessary for the proper development and distribution of traffic within
its own district.

Any such specific suggestions cannot at the present time be other than
fanciful; and they are offered, not because of their immediate or
proximate practical value, but because of the indication they afford of
the purposes which must be kept in mind in drawing up a radical plan of
railroad reorganization in the ultimate national interest. All such
plans of reorganization should carefully respect existing railroad
property values, unless the management of those railroads obstinately
and uncompromisingly opposed all concessions necessary to the
realization of the national interest. In that event the nation would be
as much justified in fighting for its essential interests as would under
analogous circumstances a municipality. Furthermore, any such
reorganization should aim at keeping the benefits of the then existing
private organization--whatever they might be. It should remain true to
the principle that, so far as economic authority and power is delegated
in the form of terminable leases to private corporations, such power
should be complete within certain defined limits. If agents of the
national economic interest cannot be trusted to