ndependent than
they used to be, it is not because they have been protected by the state
against the penalties of independence, but because they have been
aroused to more independent thought and action by the intrusion and the
discussion of momentous issues. In the long run that vote which is
really useful and significant is the vote cast in the open with a full
sense of conviction and responsibility.

Another popular reforming device which belongs to the same class and
which will fail to accomplish the expected result is the system of
direct primaries. It may well be that this device will in the long run
merely emphasize the evil which it is intended to abate. It will tend to
perpetuate the power of the professional politician by making his
services still more necessary. Under it the number of elections will be
very much increased, and the amount of political business to be
transacted will grow in the same proportion. In one way or another the
professional politician will transact this business; and in one way or
another he will make it pay. Under a system of direct primaries the
machine could not prevent the nomination of the popular candidate
whenever public opinion was aroused; so it is with the existing system.
But whenever public interest flags,--and it is bound to flag under such
an absurd multiplication of elections and under such a complication of
electoral machinery,--the politicians can easily nominate their own
candidates. Up to date no method has been devised which would prevent
them from using their personal followers in the primary elections of
both parties; and no such method can be devised without enforcing some
comparatively fixed distinction between a Republican and a Democrat, and
thus increasing the difficulties of independent voting. In case the
number of elective officials were decreased, as has been proposed above,
there would be fewer objections to the direct primary. Under the
suggested method of organization each election would become of such
importance that public opinion would be awakened and would be likely to
obtain effective expression; and the balloting for the party candidates
would arouse as much interest, particularly in the case of the dominant
party, as the final election itself. In fact, the danger would be under
such circumstances that the primaries would arouse too much interest,
and that the parties would become divided into embittered and
unscrupulous factions. Genuinely patrio