He could accomplish nothing without the
support of public opinion; yet he could be held absolutely responsible
for the good government of the state. A demagogue elected to a position
of such power and responsibility might do a great deal of harm; but if a
democratic political body cannot distinguish between the leadership of
able and disinterested men and self-seeking charlatans, the loss and
perhaps the suffering, resulting from their indiscriminate blindness,
would constitute a desirable means of political education,--particularly
when the demagogue, as in the case under consideration, could not really
damage the foundations of the state. And the charlatan or the
incompetent could be sent into retreat just as soon as exposed. The
danger not only has a salutary aspect, but it seems a small price to pay
for the chance, thereby afforded, for really efficient and responsible
government. The chief executive, when supported by public opinion, would
become a veritable "Boss"; and he would inevitably be the sworn enemy of
unofficial "Bosses" who now dominate local politics. He would have the
power to purify American local politics, and this power he would be
obliged to use. The logic of his whole position would convert him into
an enemy of the machine, in so far as the machine was using any
governmental function for private, special, or partisan purposes. The
real "Boss" would destroy the sham "Bosses"; and no other means, as yet
suggested, will, I believe, be sufficient to accomplish such a result.

After the creation of such a system of local government the power of the
professional politician would not last a year longer than the people
wanted it to last. The governor would control the distribution of all
those fruits of the administrative and legislative system upon which the
machine has lived. There could be no trafficking in offices, in public
contracts, or in legislation; and the man who wished to serve the state
unofficially would have to do so from disinterested motives. Moreover,
the professional politician could not only be destroyed, but he would
not be needed. At present he is needed, because of the prodigious amount
of business entailed by the multiplicity of elective officials. Somebody
must take charge of this political detail; and it has, as we have
already remarked, drifted into the hands of specialists. These
specialists cannot be expected to serve for nothing. Their effort to
convert their work into a means