y through such a machinery can the local public
spirit receive any effective expression. It can hardly be expected that
American citizens will bring as much public spirit to their local public
business as to the more stirring affairs of the whole nation; and what
local patriotism there is should be confronted by no unnecessary
obstacles. If a mistake or an abuse occurs, the responsibility for it
should be unmistakable and absolute, while if a reform candidate or
party is victorious, they should control a machinery of government
wholly sufficient for their purposes.
As soon as any attempt is made to devise a system which does concentrate
responsibility and power, serious difficulties are encountered.
Concentration of responsibility can be brought about in one of two
ways--either by subordinating the legislature to the executive or the
executive to the legislature. There are precedents both here and abroad
in favor of each of these methods, and their comparative advantages must
be briefly sketched.
The subordination of the executive to the legislature would conform to
the early American political tradition. We have usually associated
executive authority with arbitrary and despotic political methods, and
we have tended to assume that a legislative body was much more
representative of popular opinion. During or immediately succeeding the
Revolutionary War, the legislatures of the several states were endowed
with almost complete control--a control which was subject only to the
constitutional bills of rights; and it has been seriously and frequently
proposed to revive this complete legislative responsibility. Under such
a system, the legislature would elect the chief executive, if not the
judicial officials; and it would become like the British Parliament
exclusively and comprehensively responsible for the work of
government--both in its legislative and administrative branches.
The foregoing type of organization has so many theoretical advantages
that one would like to see it tried in some American states. But for the
present it is not likely to be tried. The responsibility of the
legislature could not be exercised without the creation of some
institution corresponding to the British Cabinet: and the whole tendency
of American political development has been away from any approach to the
English Parliamentary system. Whatever the theoretical advantages of
legislative omnipotence, it would constitute in this country a dang
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