ther without
alarming the Continental Powers: and that pretext was afforded me by
the projected descent upon England."[338]

It is also quite possible that his aim was Ireland as much as England.
It certainly was in the plan of September, 1804: and doubtless it
still held a prominent place in his mind, except during the few days
when he pictured Calder vanquished and Nelson scouring the West
Indies. Then he doubtless fixed his gaze solely upon London. But there
is much indirect evidence which points to Ireland as forming at least
a very important part of his scheme. Both Nelson and Collingwood
believed him to be aiming at Ireland.[339]

But indeed Napoleon is often unfathomable. Herein lies much of the
charm of Napoleonic studies. He is at once the Achilles, the Mercury,
and the Proteus of the modern world. The ease with which his mind
grasped all problems and suddenly concentrated its force on some new
plan may well perplex posterity as it dazed his contemporaries. If we
were dealing with any other man than Napoleon, we might safely say
that an invasion of England, before the command of the sea had been
secured, was infinitely less likely than a descent on Ireland. The
landing of a _corps d'armee_ there would have provoked a revolution;
and British ascendancy would have vanished in a week. Even had Nelson
returned and swept the seas, Ireland would have been lost to the
United Kingdom; and Britain, exhausted also by the expenses which the
Boulogne preparations had compelled her to make for the defence of
London, must have succumbed.

If ever Napoleon intended risking all his fortunes on the conquest of
England, it can be proved that his mind was gradually cleared of
illusions. He trusted that a popular rising would overthrow the British
Government: people and rulers showed an accord that had never been known
since the reign of Queen Anne. He believed, for a short space, that the
flotilla could fight sea-going ships out at sea: the converse was proved
up to the hilt. Finally, he trusted that Villeneuve, when burdened with
Spanish ships, would outwit and outmanoeuvre Nelson!

What then remained after these and many other disappointments? Surely
that scheme alone was practicable, in which the command of the sea
formed only an unimportant factor. For the conquest of England it was
an essential factor. In Ireland alone could Napoleon find the
conditions on which he counted for success--a discontented populace
that would